The 1970's witnessed an expansion of the federal prosecutor's role in the enforcement of the federal criminal law. Armed by Congress at the decade's inception with potent new investigatory tools,' federal prosecutors fashioned theories that expanded the application of various criminal statutes to cover activities not previously subjected to federal scrutiny. 2 Spurred by the public outrage resulting from Watergate and localized political scandals, federal prosecutors across the country intensified their efforts in the prosecution of white collar crime and public corruption. As part of this intensified prosecutorial effort, personnel in the United States Attorneys' offices in several large cities placed an increased emphasis on the investigation of such crimes and often became personally involved in investigations involving the traditional federal criminal investigatory agencies.
3 For example, the United States Attorney's office in Chicago organized a specialized unit staffed by experienced prosecutors whose assigned tasks were to coordinate *Partner, law office of Sonnenschein Carlin Nath & Rosenthal, Chicago, and former Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois.
'The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 201(a), 84 Stat. 923 (1970) , provided federal prosecutors with a new immunity statute, 18 U.S.C. § § 6001-6003 (1976) , with which grand jury testimony could be compelled; a recalcitrant witness statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1976) , under which witnesses could be incarcerated for civil contempt if they refused to testify; and a statutory scheme for the creation of special grand juries in larger districts, 18 U.S.C. § § 3331-3334 (1976) , under which the life of such grand juries could be extended up to three years. 2See*W. SEYMOUR, UNITED STATES A"rroRNEY 174-75 (1975) Appeal: 1974 Term Criminal Law and Procedure, 64 GEO. LJ. 173, 174 (1975 . 3 The offices headquartered in Baltimore, Chicago, New York, Newark, and Philadelphia were in the forefront of such efforts.
and supervise the investigations of alleged financial crimes and public corruption. 4 The expansion of prosecutorial activity in the 1970's, however, was not without criticism from the bar s and the bench. 6 Therefore, as the 1980's commence, some circumspection is in order. Even a chief advocate of increased prosecutor coordination and involvement in the investigation of crime, the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, Earl J. Silbert, has warned: " [T] he prosecutor's assuming more extensive responsibilities and exerting increased influence and power in order to control crime increases his potential and capacity for abuse." The potential and capacity for prosecutorial abuse is heightened at the preindictment stage of the federal criminal process, which historically has been carried on largely in secret. A defendant's rights may be irreparably prejudiced at this phase of ihe criminal process without the defendant, his lawyer, or the court ever finding out. It is, therefore, necessary for federal prosecutors at the preindictment stage to be particularly scrupulous in their conduct. The purpose of this article is to explore the parameters of prosecutorial conduct at the investigative stage of the federal criminal justice system and to consider what is proper prosecutorial conduct prior to bringing a formal charge against a defendant. 
I. IMPACT OF PUBLISHED STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT
Federal prosecutors can look to several published sources for suggested standards of conduct in preindictment activities. Whether any of these published standards of conduct have any legally binding effect on federal prosecutors' actions is questionable. These published standards do, however, provide guidance to both prosecutors and the courts in examining the propriety of prosecutorial conduct. Among the published standards which prosecutors ought to consider are the advisory prosecutorial standards of conduct issued by various ,professional organizations.8 The federal courts often refer to such standards in addressing issues of prosecutorial conduct. 9 No published federal decision has ever granted relief based solely upon a prosecutor's failure to adhere to these advisory standards.
Another source of guidance for federal prosecutors is the United States Attorneys' Manual circulated by the Department of Justice. This Manual is provided "for the internal guidance of the U.S. Attorneys' Offices and those other organizational units of the Department concerned with litigation." (1977) .
9 See, e.g., United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 555 (3rd Cir. 1979) ; United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 626 (2nd Cir. 1979) ; United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supj. 1336 , 1344 (N.D. Il1. 1979 . 28 C.F.R. § 0.16(b) (1978) . Dep't ofJustice, United States Attorneys ' Manual (Aug. 31, 1976) provisions of the U.S. Attorneys' Manual do not have the same recognized status as the provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations and, therefore, do not have the force and effect of law. Second, the Manual contains an express disclaimer stating that its provisions were never intended to create substantive or procedural rights for the benefit of any party.' 2 The Shulman court relied on this disclaimer to distinguish its decision from United States v. Caceres, 1 3 in which the Ninth Circuit reversed a conviction because the Internal Revenue Service agents investigating the defendant had failed to comply with certain provisions of the IRS Manual. The Shulman court noted that the IRS Manual contained no 12 The pertinent portion of the U.S. Attorneys' Manual states:
1-1.100 PURPOSE OF THE MANUAL
This United States Attorneys' Manual is a text prepared to aid the United States Attorneys and their Assistants in the performance of their important public responsibilities. It is designed to be the single repository of all materials and general policies and procedures relevant to the work of the United States Attorneys' Offices and to their relations with the Department of Justice with the legal divisions, investigative agencies, other bureaus and divisions, and the Office of Management and Finance (see Administrative Directives System for purely administrative guidance). The contents of this Manual are, accordingly, a necessary and invaluable guide to the United States Attorneys, their Assistants, and attorneys of the legal divisions in carrying out their duties and exercising their discretion, under the direction of the Attorney General, in representing the United States.
This Manual provides only internal Department of Justice guidance. It is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal. Nor are any limitations hereby placed on otherwise lawful litigative prerogatives of the Department of Justice.
U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 10, § 1-1.100. 13545 F.2d 1182 13545 F.2d (9th Cir. 1976 13545 F.2d ), rev'd, 440 U.S. 741 (1979 . In Caceres, the Ninth Circuit reversed a criminal conviction for the mere noncompliance with an agency's administrative regulation absent a constitutional or statutory violation by the agency members. 545 F.2d at 1187.
The Ninth Circuit relied upon its opinion in United States v. Sourapas, 515 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1975) , and that of the First Circuit in United States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1970) , as support for its ruling. Several other courts both before and after Caceres have held to the contrary. See, e.g., United States v. Mapp, 561 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1977) , aff'g 420 F. Supp. 461, 464 (E.D. Wis. 1976) ; United States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076 , 1088 -89 (2d Cir. 1975 ; United States v. Lockyer, 448 F.2d 417, 420-21 (10th Cir. 1971) ; United States v. Hutul, 416 F.2d 607, 626 (7th Cir. 1969) , cert. denied, 396 U. S. 1012 (1970) . [Vol. 71 disclaimer like that in the U.S. Attorneys' Manual.' 4 At the time of the Shulman decision, the Supreme Court had granted certiorari and heard argument in Caceres but had not yet rendered its opinion.
s In
Caceres the defendant had attempted to bribe an IRS agent who, without the knowledge of the defendant, had been outfitted with electronic surveillance equipment. The Ninth Circuit held that because the agents who conducted the electronic surveillance had failed to adhere to the Internal Revenue Service Manual guidelines for electronic surveillance operations, the recordings should have been suppressed. 6 The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld the defendant's conviction. 17 The Supreme Court expressed concern that an application of the exclusionary rule to every breach of agency internal procedural regulations arising in the context of a criminal prosecution "could have a serious deterrent impact on the formulation of additional standards to govern prosecutorial and police procedures"' 8 and stated that absent a statutory or constitutional violation by the agents, their breach of the internal agency guidelines did not require suppression of the recordings. The Court stated that even though the Administrative Procedure Act 19 authorized judicial invalidation of agency action that violated the agency's own regulations, the case before it was not a suit to invalidate agency action, rather it was an appeal from a criminal conviction, and, therefore, the Administrative Procedure Act did not provide grounds for enforcement of the regulations violated by the agents. 20 The dissent in Caceres found this position untenable because in several cases the Supreme Court had required federal agencies to conform to their own regulations even though those regulations exceeded what was necessary to comply with applicable statutes or the Constitution. 2 '
The import of the Caceres case is that persons adversely affected by a violation of federal agency internal guidelines will not be afforded relief if those guidelines surpass the requirements of the 14 466 F. Supp. at 300.
"' See United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741 (1979) . 16545 F.2d at 1187. 17440 U. S. 741, 744 (1979) . ' 8 1d. at 755-56. '9 5 U.S.C. § § 551-559 (1976) . 20 440 U.S. at 753-54. 21 Id. at 757 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
Constitution or federal statutes. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court did not cite" previous authority upholding prosecutorial action taken in contravention of internal Department of Justice guidelines.22 Presumably, the Caceres decision applies to internal prosecutorial guidelines as well as internal investigative guidelines. The question the Caceres decision does leave open, however, is the effect of agency guidelines which are not merely internal, but which are promulgated in the Code of Federal Regulations."
The S. 363, 372 (1957) . 24 28 C.F.R. § § 45.735-1 to 45.735-26 (1978) . 25 United States v. Shulman, 466 F. Supp. 293, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) . See also United States v. King, 590 F.2d 253, 256-57 (8th Cir. 1978) , cert. denied, 440 U. S. 973 (1979) ; In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806, 813 (5th Cir. 1972) .
26 28 C.F.R. § 45-735.1(b) (1978) . 27 470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1979 . The court stated: An attorney for the government who acts both as a lawyer and as a witness engages in conduct that is contrary to Ethical Consideration 5-9 and Discipli- Although the federal courts for the most part heretofore have declined to grant putative defendants meaningful relief for violations of these published standards in the absence of a prosecutorial violation of a statute or deprivation of constitutional rights, these standards, nonetheless, provide federal prosecutors with benchmarks for their conduct with which they should comply in good faith in conducting their official functions. Therefore, throughout this article as various preindictment prosecutorial activities are discussed, reference will Responsibility (1975) , prohibitions to which government attorneys have been made subject by 28 C.F.R. § 45.735-1 (b) and by this court's supervisory authority. Id. at 1351. See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RasPONSIBILiTy EC 5-9, DR 5-101(B) (1975) .
28 593 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1979 ). 2 26 C.F.R. § 601.107(b) (2) (1979) provides that: "A taxpayer who may be the subject of a criminal recommendation will be afforded a district Criminal Investigation conference when he requests one...." ao 593 F.2d at 622. A similar statement could be made of the standards of conduct provision regarding the canons of professional ethics of the American Bar Association in 28 C.F.R. § 45.735-1(b) (1978) 3 See, e.g., United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir. 1975 ), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976 (Jan. 18, 1977) , reprinted in [1978] 24 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3001.
H ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 3.1 (a). 3 9 Id. § 3.5.
40 18 U.S.C. § 3321 (1976) ; FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a). 41 A regular federal grand jury can be empaneled for a maximum period of only 18 months. FED. R. CRIM. P.
6(g).
The term ofspecial federal grand juries, which may be empaneled only in judicial districts of populations of more than four million inhabitants, may be extended beyond 18 months up to a maximum of 36 months. 18 U.S.C. § § 3331-3334 (1976) .
42
Prosecutors typically decide what witnesses should appear before the grand jury, draft the subpoenas, and conduct the primary questioning of the witnesses. Cf. United States v. Thompson, 251 U. S. 407,413-14 (1920) (" [T] he duty of the district'attorney to direct the attention of a grand jury to crimes which he thinks have been committed is coterminous with the authority of the grand jury to entertain such charges.").
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed this notion over the years. In United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974) , Justice Powell stated:
The scope of the grand jury's powers reflects its enjoy wide discretion in performing their tasks, the prosecutors' employment of the grand jury subjects their conduct to the authority and supervision of the courts. 4 Therefore, prosecutorial conduct in using the power of the federal grand jury is not unfettered. For example, federal prosecutors' use of the grand jury's power can only be for the discovery of criminal activities. Grand jury 'abuse is committed if a government attorney focuses the investigation toward uncovering evidence to be used in a civil action. 45 Although a grand jury proceeding must special role in insuring fair and effective law enforcement. A grand jury proceeding is not an adversary hearing in which the guilt or innocence of the accused is adjudicated. Rather, it is an ex parte investigation to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether criminal proceedings should be instituted against any person. The grand jury's investigative power must be broad if its public responsibility is adequately to be discharged. It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope ofwhose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime. As has been said before, the identity of the offender, and the precise nature of the offense, if there be one, normally are developed at the conclusion of the grand jury's labors, not at the beginning. Id. at 282.
In United States v. Brown, 574 F.2d 1274, 1275-76 (5th Cir. 1978) , the Fifth Circuit stated:
By its very nature, the grand jury process is not an adversary proceeding. Its function is merely to determine if there is probable cause which warrants the defendant's being bound over for trial. A defendant has no right to require that the Government present all available evidence at this proceeding. The grand jury proceeding is a one-sided affair. The defendant is protected from such one-sidedness when, at the trial on the merits, he is "accorded the full protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments" and is "permitted to expose all of the facts bearing upon his guilt or innocence. Another abuse of the grand jury's investigative power occurs when a prosecutor uses a grand jury to gather evidence to prove the charges of an indictment that has already been returned.' But evidence uncovered during the course of a continuing grand jury investigation may be used at the trial of a previously pending charge. 4 9 In order to reconcile these seemingly conflicting principles and determine whether the prosecutor's use of evidence obtained postindictment by a grand jury was improper, the federal courts generally look to the prosecutor's intent in conducting the investigation from which the evidence was derived. S. 677 (1958) ). Under the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U. S. 298 (1978) , IRS civil investigatory summonses became unenforcible once criminal prosecution was recommended. "Parallel" and simultaneous civil investigatory proceedings by the SEC after criminal referral were approved in SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., [1979] defendant contended that the appearance was a misuse of the grand jury, but the government responded that this testimony related to the investigation of a possible conspiracy to obstruct justice. The court held that since the government's action was not for the "sole or dominating purpose of preparing an already pending indictment for trial," the postindictment use of the grand jury was permissible.
1
The federal courts in applying the "sole or dominating purpose" test have upheld several postindictment uses of the grand jury. For example, it has been held permissible for a prosecutor to use a grand jury to investigate yet uncharged criminal offenses arising from the area of activity under investigation 52 and to discover the existence of unknown coconspirators to a previously charged crime. 53 Postindictment grand jury investigation to discover potential alibi witnesses was criticized by the court, but held not to require reversal unless the defendant could prove prejudice.5 But the postindictment use of the grand jury to question a defendant about an offense for which he had been secretly indicted was held to constitute prosecutorial abuse requiring reversal.
5 " A question not yet addressed by the federal courts arises when the "sole or dominating" purpose of the grand jury investigation is shifted by the prosecutor. After potentially useful trial evidence is discovered as an incident of a legitimate continuing investigation, a prosecutor may shift the purpose of the investigation in order to fully develop that evidence through the use of the grand jury for maximum benefit at the trial of the pending charge. To protect against this abuse, federal courts confronting the issue of postindictment use of the grand jury should not look just at the prosecutor's purpose at the investigation's incep- Cir. 1973 Cir. ), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013 Cir. (1975 . See also In re Santiago, 533 F.2d 727, 730 (1st Cir. 1976 dards 59 and has been severely criticized and condemned by the courts.
6° Absent a pervasive prosecutorial practice of using subpoenas for the purpose of obtaining office interviews, the federal courts, however, appear reluctant to administer sanctions.
6 '
B. PREAPPEARANCE INTERVIEW OR REVIEW
Often witnesses who are subpoenaed for a grand jury appearance desire a preappearance conference with the prosecutor to determine their status in the investigation. Similarly, a prosecutor may wish to informally interview a witness who has been subpoenaed to determine whether the witness has any information of value to the grand jury. The practice of conducting a preappearance interview with a subpoenaed grand jury witness has received judicial approval on the ground that it assists in eliminating unnecessary inconvenience to both the witness and the grand jury that would be caused by examining a witness at a grand jury session who had no information of benefit to the grand jury's When a prosecutor decides on the basis of a preappearance interview to excuse a subpoenaed witness from testifying before the grand jury,6 the situation closely resembles the "office subpoena" practice condemned by the courts. Whether abuse has been committed should depend on the intent of the prosecutor in causing the service of the subpoena. If the prosecutor actually intended to use the witness before the grand jury, but decided the witness had no information and therefore excused the witness, no abuse has been committed. If the prosecutor's purpose in having the grand jury subpoena served was to secure an interview with the witness, the prosecutor has abused his office. To avoid potential abuse, prosecutors should advise a grand jury of their decision not to call a subpoenaed witness so an accurate record can be made of the grand jury's authorization of this decision. Otherwise, prosecutors may be considered to have withheld evidence from the grand jury.
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A similar situation arises when a witness has been subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury to present nontestimonial evidence such as fingerprints or handwriting exemplars. Typically, this type of evidence is not obtained in the grand jury's presence because handwriting exemplars and fingerprints are usually not meaningful to the grand jury without review and analysis. To conserve the grand jury's time, prosecutors often have the material analyzed after it has been acquired (through the use of grand jury subpoenas), but before the material or the witness providing it has actually been presented to the grand jury. Where prosecutors conducting a grand jury investigation have not obtained the approval or direction of the grand jury to proceed with the requisition of the material through the use of the subpoena power, their acsummarize in the grand jury the statements of subpoenaed witnesses at interviews outside the grand jury's presence was upheld); Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of IRS, 406 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1976) . 6 Although it has been accepted practice for prosecutors to excuse the appearance of subpoenaed grand jury witnesses, some courts have questioned whether a prosecutor has the power apart from the grand jury to do so. See, e.g., In re Nwamu, 421 F. Supp. 1361 Supp. , 1365 Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1976 . See also United States v. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) .
Cf In re Special April 1977 Grand Jury, 587 F.2d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 1978 ) (court upheld district court's denial of hearing on whether government unlawfully withheld evidence from the grand jury by dismissing prospective witnesses from their scheduled appearances because petitioner presented "no concrete evidence" suggesting that the government breached its duty).
tions have been held to be an abuse of the grand jury subpoena power.6
The prosecutor in In re Melvin initially subpoenaed Melvin to appear before a grand jury, which then directed Melvin to submit to fingerprinting and photographing. Melvin first refused to submit to the tests and did so only upon court order compelling him to comply with the grand jury's direction. The prosecutor then sought to compel Melvin's appearance at a lineup and was able to obtain a court order compelling Melvin's appearance without any grand jury authorization or direction. On a writ of mandamus, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated that order and held that in the absence of a specific direction from the grand jury, the entry of the order was improper. The court stated:
The order involves a major intrusion upon personal liberty which, if justified, is justified only upon the basis of the grand jury's unique investigative powers....
In any event, the broadest delegation of a power of this magnitude to the United States Attorney cannot be accepted if the grand jury's own role is to remain at all meaningful. States Attorney's office. The prosecutor then requested that they provide handwriting exemplars in furtherance of the grand jury's investigation. The witnesses were told that they could provide the exemplars voluntarily or be brought before the court and ordered to do so on pain of contempt. O'Kane and the others provided the exemplars voluntarily and were later brought before the grand jury. At no time did the grand jury direct O'Kane or the others to provide the exemplars. After O'Kane was indicted, the district court granted his motion to suppress the exemplars on [Vol. 71 the basis that they were obtained without grand jury directive.6s Both the Melvin court and the O'Kane court held that when evidence was obtained outside the grand jury's presence through the use of a grand jury subpoena without a directive from the grand jury, it was "no mere technical error ... but an error affecting the proper roles of the prosecutor and the grand jury, since to endorse such a procedure would be to allow the United States Attorney to assume the powers of a grand jury.
7 0 Thus, prosecutors wishing to insure the propriety of their actions must consult with and obtain authorization from a grand jury whenever the subpoena power is to be employed for the acquisition of evidence outside the grand jury room.
C. REQUIRING PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND

OTHER
MATERIALS
The federal prosecutors' ability to use the broad power of the grand jury to compel the production of documents by subpoena is, like other matters of prosecutorial conduct, not without limitation. Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides a framework within which federal prosecutors must work in drafting subpoenae duces tecum for issuance on behalf of a grand jury.
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Motions to quash a grand jury subpoena duces tecum have been granted where the amount of material being sought is excessive or beyond the possible focus of the investigation 72 or is privileged. A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents or other objects designated therein. The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. The court may direct that books, papers, documents or objects designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their production permit the books, papers, documents or objects or portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys. FEn. R. CRIM. P. 17(c). 7a Constitutional privileges such as the fifth amendment may be asserted to defeat the requirement of doeThe courts usually consider three elements in determining whether a subpoena duces tecum has been properly drawn. First, the materials sought must be relevant to the investigation being pursued; 7 4 second, the subpoena must sufficiently de- (D.R.I. 1975) , and the eases cited therein.
75 The "reasonable particularity" standard typically applied by the courts is that the items requested be described in a fashion "that a person attempting to exercise a subpoena may in good faith know what he is being asked to produce. As to the oppressiveness of the subpoena to the party upon which it is served, the mere volume of the material sought is not conclusive of the issue of oppressiveness. See In re Certain Chinese Family Benevolent and Dist. Ass'ns, 19 F.R.D. 97, 100-01 (N. D. Cal. 1956 ). The volume of material is, however, a factor to be considered by prosecutors in drafting subpoenas. In In re Grand Jury Investigation (General Motors Corp.), 174 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1956 ), the court quashed a subpoena that would have required "production of practically every paper outside of routine correspondence relating to every phase of the corporation's affairs, in an unlimited exploratory investigation ... 'whose purposes and limits can be determined only as it proceeds.' " Id. at 395 (footnote omitted). See also In re Nadelson, 353 F. Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ; In re Harry Alexander, Inc., 8 F.R.D.
(S.D.N.Y. 1949).
Another factor considered is the cost of copying the subpoenaed documents which rests on the party subpoenaed, unless that cost is oppressive.
properly should give each of these factors individual consideration in preparing a grand jury subpoena duces tecum.
If a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum is filed alleging that the material sought is not relevant to the matter under investigation, most federal courts require that the government make a showing of relevance.
7 7 Prima facie relevance of the material sought to the matter under investigation is usually established by the government through an argument based on the face of the subpoena, or it can submit a prosecutor's affidavit stating the connection between the scope of the investigation and subpoenaed materials. All grand jury witnesses should be accorded reasonable advance notice of their appearance before the grand jury. "Forthwith" or "eo instanter' subpoenas should be used only when swift action is important and then only with the prior approval of the United States Attorney. Considerations, among others, which bear upon the desirability of using such subpoenas include the following: 1) the risk of flight; 2) the risk of destruction or fabrication of evidence; 3) the need for the orderly presentation of evidence; and 4) the degree of inconvenience to the witness. The subpoena required him to produce records before a grand jury that same morning. The respondent told the agents that he could not appear before the grand jury that morning because he had to go to work. An assistant United States attorney arrived at the respondent's home and suggested that the respondent's appearance could be excused if he would agree to turn the subpoenaed records over to one of the agents that evening and not to tamper with them in the meantime. The respondent agreed and complied that evening. The investigation eventually led to the indictment of someone other than the respondent. The defendant in Re moved to suppress the documents based on a fourth amendment challenge to the forthwith subpoena. The court denied the motion, but was able to avoid the question of whether forthwith subpoenas violate the fourth amendment. The court simply held that a "seizure" did not take place in that case because the enforcement of the subpoena forthwith was excused and the respondent "voluntarily complied" by turning over the documents to the agent.ss
In re Nwarmu s6 came before the Southern District of New York on a motion to quash a forthwith subpoena and force a return of the documents. In Nwamu an FBI agent served a forthwith subpoena on a corporate officer calling for the production before a grand jury of certain corporate records on Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976) , the court refused to suppress a "forthwith" subpoena issued by a federal prosecutor to a bank calling for production of the subpoenaed material "to any agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who was designated therein as the 'agent of the grand jury."' The grand jury was not sitting and was therefore unavailable to accept the "forthwith" production. The officer agreed, and the agent took the subpoenaed files. Instead of going to the grand jury, the agent took the files to the FBI office. The next day agents returned to the corporate offices with three more forthwith subpoenas. This time an attempt to telephone the corporation's attorney was successful. The attorney told the agent over the phone that "'[n]othing is to leave that office.'"" The agent, who already had possession of the subpoenaed items, disregarded the attorney's request and left the premises with the subpoenaed items.
The court in Nwamu quashed the subpoena and ordered the return of the materials to the corporation. The court stated:
We find, therefore, upon consideration of the totality of circumstances here, that compliance with the subpoenas would be unreasonable and oppressive; that neither movants nor their employees voluntarily consented to surrender of the subpoenaed items; and that the agents' taking of the subpoenaed items constitute[s] an unreasonable and unlawful search and seizure. 9 1
Neither the Re court nor the Nwamu court addressed the issue of the prosecutor's failure to obtain grand jury authorization or direction for the forthwith production of records outside the grand jury room.
92 But federal prosecutors, to avoid impropriety in the use of forthwith subpoenas, should first consult with the grand jury and obtain approval of forthwith process. Similarily, prosecutors should also obtain prior grand jury approval if the agent serving the subpoena intends to take immediate custody of the subpoenaed materials as an accommodation to the witness upon whom the forthwith subpoena is served. 3.5 Relations with grand jury.
(a) Where the prosecutor is authorized to act as legal advisor to the grand jury he may appropriately explain the law and express his opinion on the legal significance of the evidence but he should give due deference to its status as an independent legal body.
(b) The prosecutor should not make statements or arguments in an effort to influence grand jury action in a manner which would be impermissible at trial before a petit jury.
(c) The prosecutor's communications and presentations to the grand jury should be on the record.9
93 See United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 628 (2d Cir. 1979 ) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 88 (1935) ) ("The ex parte character of grand jury proceedings makes it peculiarly important for a federal prosecutor to remember that, in the familiar phrase, the interest of the United States 'in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.' ") The portion from the Berger opinion to which Judge Friendly in Ciambrone refers is a standard by which every prosecutor should conduct all his official actions:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. 295 U.S. at 88. See also United States v. Asdrubal-Herrera, 470 F. Supp. 939, 943 (N.D. Ill. 1979) .
9 ABA PROSE CUrION STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 3.5. The comments to § 3.5, which further articulate standards by which a prosecutor should conduct himself before the grand jury, state:
A prosecutor should not, however, take advantage of his role as the ex parte representative of the state before the grand jury to unduly or unfairly influence it in voting upon charges brought before it. In general, he should be guided by the standards governing and defining the proper presentation of the state's case in an adversary trial before a petit jury. Id. § 3.5 comments (emphasis added).
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The United States Attorneys' Manual states:
In his dealings with the grand jury, the prosecutor must always conduct himself as an officer of the court whose function is to insure that justice is done and that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He must recognize that the grand jury is an independent body, whose functions include not only the investigation of crime and the initiation of criminal prosecution but also the protection of the citizenry from unfounded criminal charges. The prosecutor's responsibility is to advise the grand jury on the law and to present evidence for its consideration. In discharging these responsibilities, he must be scrupulously fair to all witnesses and must do nothing to inflame or otherwise improperly influence the grand jurors.
9s
For the most part, fulfillment of a prosecutor's dual obligation when he is appearing before the grand jury depends on the personal integrity of the prosecutor. If a conflict arises between a prosecutor's role as an advocate and his role as the grand jury's advisor, fairness dictates that the role of advisor must take precedence.
B. WHO MAY ATrEND SESSIONS
In the federal system, attorneys representing grand jury witnesses and putative defendants, and all but certain authorized persons, are excluded from attendance at grand jury sessions. 97 Rule 6(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure identifies the people authorized to be present when the grand jury is in session. 98 The presence of an un-95 United States Attorneys' Manual, supra note 10, § 9-11.015 (Aug. 17, 1978) . Attorneys for the government, the witness under examination, interpreters when needed and, for the purpose of taking the evidence, a stenographer or operator of a recording device may be present while the grand jury is deliberating or voting." Not all lawyers employed by the United States government come within the scope of the phrase "attorneys for the government." Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure defines "attorney for the government" to mean the Attorney General or an authorized assistant of the Attorney General, a United authorized person at a grand jury session may, but does not automatically, vitiate an indictment.9 Although the language of the rule is clear, its application has created some recent controversy in the federal courts. The debate revolves around two issues: first, whether the prior involvement of an appointed special attorney with an agency investigation of the same matter that the grand jury is investigating disqualifies that attorney and makes him an unauthorized person before the grand jury in violation of rule 6(d); second, whether a federal prosecutor's attendance at grand jury sessions subsequent to his appearance as a witness in the same investigation makes him an unauthorized person in those subsequent sessions in violation of rul'
6(e).
The federal courts are split on both issues. As to the first, however, the Seventh Circuit,' t° the Third '03 Such agency attorneys are appointed by the Attorney General as special assistant United States attorneys pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § § 515(a), 534 (1976) . The permissibility of appointing special assistant attorneys was examined and upheld in In re Subpoena of Persico, 522 F.2d 41, 56-60 (2d Cir. 1975) . See also United States v. Wrigley, 520 F.2d 362, 365-67 (8th Cir. 1975 [A]lthough the prosecutor should not be a professional associate of defense counsel, there is no conflict or appearance of conflict in his being professionally associated with other lawyers interested in the prosecution. The prosecutor of course is himself interested in the prosecution, but that is not the sort of interest that creates a conflict. 0 7
As to the second issue, the prosecutor-witness conflict, the Third Circuit in United States v. Birdman criticized the practice, but has stated that a prosecutor testifying as a grand jury witness does not per se require dismissal of an indictment. The Birdman court held that although abuse might be possible in certain cases, prosecutorial testimony alone is not sufficient for reversal.ses However, the Birdman ruling on this point is contrary to district court decisions in the Fifth' 9 and Seventh u° Circuits.
The basis for this controversy stems from the ethical consideration of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility which states: "The roles of an advocate and of a witness are inconsistent; the function of an advocate is to advance or argue the cause of another, while that of a witness is to state facts objectively.""' Those who argue for per se dismissal assert that the same ethical considerations that dictate that prosecutors should not be witnesses at the trial of cases in which they act as an advocate should disqualify them from being witnesses in grand jury proceedings in which they act as attorneys for the government. The argument is bolstered by the ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, which state that a prosecutor should not attempt in a matter upon the merits of which he has acted in a judicial capacity. (B) A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee. (C) A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence improperly or upon irrelevant grounds any tribunal, legislative body, or public official.
Id. DR 9-101 (footnotes omitted).
107 that the courts have held that, in the absence of undue influence, a breach of rule 6(d) does not rise to a constitutional infirmity vitiating the proceeding and any indictment resulting therefrom. In Walker v. Estelle' the court held that a court reporter's presence during grand jury deliberations was not an infirmity of constitutional proportion sufficient to void a proceeding absent a showing of undue influence. Arguably, the rule should be no different for prosecutors who, if without asserting undue influence, remain in the grand jury room after they have testified as witnesses. 12 2 This discussion indicates that the Third Circuit in United States v. Birdman clearly articulated the better rule when it held that before an indictment will be dismissed in a situation where a prosecutor testified and then remained on the investigation and participated in grand jury proceedings, the defendant must show actual prejudice as a result of the prosecutorial misconduct. D. Tex. 1978) , on the basis that there the testifying prosecutor was needed to prove an essential element of the crime, while in Birdman he was a summary witness, and in Treadway, the prosecutor-witness' testimony was inaccurate in several respects, while in Birdman there was no allegation of falsification or distortion. 602 F.2d at 560-61. Although upholding the indictment, the court in Birdman articulated two sets of circumstances in which preindictment prosecutorial misconduct would result in an indictment being dismissed: one, actual prejudice to the defendant caused by the misconduct and, two, when the improper prosecutorial practice "has become so entrenched and flagrant ... as to require a prophylactic rule of dismissal." Id. at 559-60.
'A United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d at 559-61.
C. THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE AND PROSECUTORS' COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS
Despite the broad spectrum of permissible information a grand jury may utilize, there are limitations on the extent to which prosecutors may question witnesses or comment on matters under investigation. The United States Attorneys' Manual states these limits in general terms. ' 
PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT
The federal courts, however, have imposed varying sanctions in cases in which the prosecutors were negligent in presenting inaccurate information or were unaware of the falsity of the information. Most courts, however, adhere to the standard that absent evidence that the government attorneys or agents knowingly or deliberately misled the grand jury, dismissal of the indictment is not warranted.
13 ' Because the federal courts, in addressing the issue of grand jury abuse, have typically weighed evidence demonstrating guilt against the nature of the prosecutorial misconduct, the decisions establish no consistent standard for dismissal. Cir. 1979 ) (absent evidence of perjury or that prosecutor believed grand jury testimony to be false, dismissal not required; even assuming impropriety of testimony, grand jury evidence was "overwhelming" and sufficient to sustain indictment); United States v. Cathey, 591 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 1979 ) (false testimony in grand jury insufficient to require dismissal of indictment absent a showing that perjury had been committed); United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329 , 1338 (9th Cir. 1977 ), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978 (indictment should be dismissed "only in a flagrant case, and perhaps only where knowing perjury, relating to a material matter has been presented to grand jury"). See generally United States v. Sullivan, 578 F.2d 121, 124 (5th Cir. 1978 However, two recent court of appeals decisions"ss may evidence a trend in the federal courts favoring dismissal as a deterrent for prosecutorial misconduct. In United States v. Serubo'm the Third Circuit reversed the defendants' convictions and remanded the case for a determination by the district court of the appropriateness of dismissing the indictment, firmly warning prosecutors that the sanction of dismissal should and would be used against them.
We recognize that dismissal of an indictment may impose important costs upon the prosecution and the public. At a minimum, the government will be required to present its evidence to a grand jury unaffected by bias or prejudice. But the costs of continued unchecked prosecutorial misconduct are also substantial. This is particularly so before the grand jury, where the prosecutor operates without the check of a judge or a trained legal adversary, and virtually immune from public scrutiny. The prosecutor's abuse of his special relationship to the where the prosecutor called a witness a thief and a racketeer, which inspired the grand jurors to hiss and openly threaten him with loss of citizenship and imprisonment), with United States v. DiGrazia, 213 F. Supp. 232, 234-35 (N.D. Ill. 1963 ) (indictment dismissed because prosecutor used inflammatory language to impugn and discredit the witness and inflame the grand jurors against the accused). See also United States v. Wells, 163 F. 313 (9th Cir. 1908) (indictment dismissed where prosecutor told witness, "Now you know you are lying"; "I will put the screws to you," and remained in grand jury room during deliberation and voting); United States v. Whitted, 325 F. Supp. 520 (D. Neb. 1971 ), rev'dper curiam, 454 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1972 Cir. 1979) . The Third Circuit in Serubo seemed compelled to reconcile its opinion in United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1979) , handed down just two months before the Serubo decision. The Birdman court declined to adopt a prophylactic rule of dismissal for the prosecutorial improprieties presented there. The Birdman court did imply that a prophylactic rule of dismissal may be warranted absent a demonstration of actual prejudice if the conduct "was anything but an isolated incident unmotivated by sinister ends" or the conduct was "so entrenched and flagrant" to require such a sanction. 602 F.2d at 559-61 & n.61. The Serubo opinion reflects an exasperation with prosecutorial misconduct not present in prior opinions, and the Serubo court seemed to go further than Birdman by recognizing that the Second Circuit had in the past used dismissal as a "remedy to correct flagrant or persistent abuse." 604 F.2d at 817.
'34 604 F.2d at 818-19. The Serubo court remanded the case because the misconduct reviewed by the court occurred before the grand jury that conducted the major portion of the investigation. The indictment had been returned by a second grand jury, however, and the circuit court ordered discovery to determine how tainted the second grand jury was by the conduct before the first. grand jury poses an enormous risk to defendants as well. For while in theory a trial provides the defendant with a full opportunity to contest and disprove the charges against him, in practice, the handing up of an indictment will often have a devastating personal and professional impact that a later dismissal or acquittal can never undo. Where the potential for abuse is so great, and the consequences of a mistaken indictment so serious, the ethical responsibilities of the prosecutor, and the obligation of the judiciary to protect against even the appearance of unfairness, are correspondingly heightened.
We suspect the dismissal of an indictment may be virtually the only effective way to encourage compliance with these ethical standards, and to protect defendants from abuse of the grand july process.-
The prosecutor in Serubo did the following: (1) he attempted to link the defendants with organized crime without laying any evidentiary foundation; (2) he referred to prior loansharking charges against persons with whom he was trying to associate the defendants and summarized evidence relating to those charges without telling the grand jury that the defendants had been acquitted; (3) he impugned the testimony of witnesses who failed to link defendants with organized crime; (4) he commented unfavorably on the veracity of witnesses; and (5) he bullied witnesses who were uncooperative with him.
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The district court found the prosecutor's conduct "generally improper, reprehensible and unaccept- before it, but recognized that, since the offensive activity had taken place primarily before a grand jury which did not return the indictment and since it had not been shown that the misconduct infected the grand jury which did return the indictment, it was possible for the indictment to survive. Therefore, the court remanded the matter to the district court for a determination on that point.'
4 ' The Serubo decision, as expansive as it is, has been criticized for failing to create a mechanism whereby grand jury abuse can be discovered and for failing to dismiss with prejudice in a case in which the grand jury had been infected with the impropriety. 4 2 The second criticism fails to recognize that dismissal of an indictment with prejudice is an extreme sanction which the federal courts are reluctant to impose.
43 Although rare, it is possible, however, that outrageous government misconduct could taint the evidence or prejudice the defendant so as to preclude the superseding charge.' 44 However, questioning witnesses in a harassing manner or prejudicing a grand jury with comments unsupported by the record is curable by recalling the witnesses before a second grand jury and obtaining the same testimony minus the prosecutorial impropriety.
The first criticism of Serubo is a valid criticism of the criminal discovery system in general, but is particularly appropriate in the area of prosecutorial misconduct. In Serubo the government provided the defendants the transcripts revealing the prosecutorial misconduct under the doctrine of (1976) .
145 373 U. S. 83 (1963) . 146 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976) . The statute requires the government to disclose to the defense any grand jury 0 in which it had reversed a district court's dismissal of an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct. The court in Samango described the facts before it as "superficially similar"'' to those in
Chanen.
Both Samango and Chanen involved three separate grand juries and two indictments. The second indictment in both cases was based solely on hearsay evidence. In both cases the testimony of the witnesses before the previous grand juries was presented by government personnel to the indicting grand jury. In Chanen the government failed to present the transcript of a previous grand jury witness whose testimony was "deemed unhelpful" by the government.
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The distinctions between Samango and Chanen upon which their opposite conclusions turned were: first, that in Chanen the agent read the previous grand jury transcripts to the indicting jury and in Samango the prosecutor left the transcripts with the grand jurors so the jurors could read the transcripts transcript or statement of any government witness after the witness has testified on direct examination at trial. In reality, the disclosure of such statements is typically made before the witness' direct examination to avoid delay in the trial. See generally United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 858 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979) ; United States v. Murphy, 569 F.2d 771, 774 n.10 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978) .
147 FED. R. CGaM. P. 6(c)(1).
'48 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979 ).
"9 United States v. Samango, 450 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Hawaii 1978) .
'5 549 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 825 (1977) .
'5' 607 F.2d at 881. '2549 F.2d at 1308 n.l. Although not specifically discussed, the failure to present this "unhelpful" testimony was apparently excused by the Chanen court as a legitimate prosecutorial act "to screen out unreliable witnesses." Id. at 1311. The Samango court criticized the prosecutor for submitting the previous grand jury testimony of the defendant Samango as "'calculated prejudice."' 607 F.2d at 883 (quoting the lower court opinion, 450 F. Supp. at 1106).
themselves; "3 second, in Chanen the transcripts had revealed that some of the witnesses had previously filed false affidavits and the prosecutor had advised the grand jurors that some of the witnesses whose transcripts were read by the agent had given inconsistent statements. The Chanen court found this to be sufficient to apprise the grand jury of the credibility problem,' 5 5 whereas the Samango court held that a witness, Granat, whose credibility was subject to question, had to be presented live "thereby enabling the grand jury to observe [his] demeanor and determine on its own whether Granat was a credible witness.
' 1 55 In sum, close analysis reveals that the Samango and Chanen facts are not as distinguishable as the Ninth Circuit presented them to be. Perhaps the reason that the court attempted to distinguish the two cases is that although the court felt compelled to exercise its supervisory powers to deter prosecutorial misconduct, it did not wish to inspire the unlimited range of allegations of misconduct of which it spoke in Chanen.
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D. RECORDING OF PROCEEDINGS
The ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS have always advised that "[t]he prosecutor's communications and presentations to the grand jury should be on the record." 1 57 Historically, the federal courts maintained that recording of federal grand jury proceedings was not mandatory.s Because of this, '53 607 F.2d at 881. '-4 549 F.2d at 1311. There is no indication in the Chanen opinion whether the prosecutor actually explained the nature or extent of the witnesses' inconsistencies. In Samango the prosecutor's and agents' comments about the cooperation and credibility of the witnesses were considered to be a part of the "cumulative effect" requiring dismissal. 607 F.2d at 884. In any event, the Chanen court did not articulate any prosecutorial obligation to present these witnesses live so the grand jurors could assess their credibility.
-5s 607 F.2d at 882. '6 549 F.2d at 1309 ("The range of prosecutorial conduct capable of inspiring allegations of unfairness appears unlimited.'). S. 824 (1971) . Although only one published federal decision has held that the failure to record matters occurring before the grand jury was an independent ground invalidating an indictment, United States v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 579 (W. D. Tex. 1977) , the courts have recognized that recording all of proceedings, including prosecutors' comments, is the better practice. See, e.g., United States v. Peden, 472 F.2d it was common practice for the court reporter not to record the prosecutor's comments or the comments of the grand jurors at a federal grand jury session when no witness was present.
1 59 This practice is no longer permissible because effective August 1, 1979, rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was amended to require the recording of all grand jury proceedings except deliberating or voting.'r° The proviso in rule 6(e)(1) that "[a]n unintentional failure" to record shall not "affect the validity of the prosecution" carries with it the inference that an intentional failure to record 583, 584 (2d Cir. 1973) . Some district courts by rule provide for the attendance of court reporters at all grand jury sessions and for the recording of all testimony of witnesses appearing. See, e.g., LOCAL CRIM. RULES OF THE NORTHERN DIsT. OF ILL. 1.04(c).
159 Historically, the practice of nonrecordation was done to allow discussion among the jurors between witnesses' appearances. Presumably, such informal discussions among jurors are not "proceedings" of the grand jury. Now with the amendment to rule 6(e), FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), requiring the recording of "all proceedings except deliberating and voting," the question arises as to whether such discussions are proceedings that must be recorded. Such discussions could fall into the "deliberating" exception to the recording requirement. Prosecutors and the grand jury court reporter are pursuant to rule 6(d), FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d), not authorized to be present at such deliberations. The outcome of the question will probably be that the court reporter will record all proceedings at which a prosecutor is present in the room. An argument could be made at least as to federal grand juries in the Northern District of Illinois that the proviso in local criminal rule 1.04(F) imposes a recording requirement of discussions between prosecutors and the grand jurors even prior to the effective date of the rule 6(e) amendment. The rule states in part:
Nothing in this order shall prohibit members of a Grand Jury from discussing, prior to deliberating on a matter, the evidence, testimony, and applicable law with the United States Attorney, Assistant United States Attorneys, or other Government counsel authorized to be before the Grand Jury, provided that such discussions are held during recorded sessions of the GrandJury.
LOCAL CRIM. RULES OF THE NORTHERN DIsT. OF ILL.
1.04(F) (emphasis added).
160 The amendment to rule 6(e), effective Aug. 1, 1979, states:
(1) Recording of Proceedings. All proceedings, except when the grand jury is deliberating or voting shall be recorded stenographically or by an electronic recording device. An unintentional failure of any recording to reproduce all or any portion of a proceeding shall not affect the validity of the prosecution. The recording or reporter's notes or any transcript prepared therefrom shall remain in the custody or control of the attorney for the government unless otherwise ordered in a particular case. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
will affect the prosecution. This issue has not been addressed thus far in any published decision. Since the only sanction rule 6(e) mentions is contempt of court, 161 a court could interpret that remedy as the sole remedy, thus preventing dismissal of an indictment even if an intentional failure to record occurred. The more probable interpretation is that the use of the words "may be punished as a contempt of court" in rule 6(e)(2) does not preclude dismissal of an indictment should the circumstances of the rule 6 violation warrant such action. Whatever sanction the court decides to impose, it can do so only if the intentional failure to record is brought to its attention. Historically, however, the discovery of grand jury material has been allowed only upon showing of "particularized need.'
162 Under that standard a defendant is placed in the untenable situation of having to show prosecutorial impropriety before he is entitled to review the material with which he may be able to show prosecutorial impropriety. A mere allegation of impropriety is insufficient to lift the curtain of grand jury secrecy under the present posture of the law.163 Courts, on occasion, have questioned the strict need for secrecy. 164 The traditional reasons for maintaining secrecy, such as protection of witnesses and innocent parties, do not apply when it is the prosecutor's comments that are sought after return of the indictment. If deterrence of prosecutorial abuse and protection of a defendant's right to an independent unbiased grand jury are the reasons for the amendment set forth in rule 6(e)(1), those goals can only be effectively reached when the 161 Rule 6(e)(2) states in part that "[a] knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (2) .
162 See Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S. 855, 868-75 (1966) ; United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 662 (2d Cir. 1978) .
l"See In re Special February 1975 Grand Jury, 565 F.2d 407, 411 (7th Cir. 1977 ) ("a mere assertion [of impropriety by government attorneys] is not enough to call for an evidentiary and further inquiry"). See also United States v. Fife, 573 F.2d 369, 372 (6th Cir. 1976) ; United States v. Greenberg, 204 F. Supp. 400, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) .
" See United States v. Thoresen, 428 F.2d 654, 668 (9th Cir. 1970 ) (the court stated: "I have never been able to accept the proposition that while extensive discovery promotes the cause of justice in civil controversies, any right to discovery on the part of a defendant in a criminal case must be severely curtailed. [Vol. 71 defendant is apprised of what the prosecutor did and said before the grand jury. Since a prosecutor's comments in grand jury proceedings are now required to be recorded, courts have no reason to withhold those comments from the defendant indicted as a result of those proceedings.
F. SUBPOENAING "TARGETS" ' OF THE INVESTIGATION
The federal courts, t65 including the Supreme Court, 5 66 have consistently recognized that the subpoena power of grand juries includes the power to compel the attendance of a putative defendant. While recognizing the power to compel the attendance of a "target,"'1 67 the United States Attorneys' Manual states:
[I]n the context of particular cases such a subpoena may carry the appearance of unfairness. Because the potential for misunderstanding is great, before a known "target" ... is subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury about his involvement in the crime under investigation, an effort should be made to secure his voluntary appearance. If his voluntary appearance cannot be obtained, he should be subpoenaed only after the grand jury and U.S. Attorney or the responsible Assistant Attorney General have approved the subpoena. In determining whether to approve a subpoena for a "target", careful attention 1976) . 167 In practice the words "target" and "subject" of the investigation are used interchangeably by both prosecutors and defense lawyers. The U.S. Attorneys' Manual draws a distinction, stating:
A "subject" of an investigation is a person whose conduct is within the scope of the grand jury's investigation. A "target" is a person as to whom the prosecutor or the grand jury has substantial evidence linking him to the commission of a crime and who, in thejudgment of the prosecutor, is a putative defendant. U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 10, § 9-11.250 (Aug. 17, 1978) . In a further refinement of these terms, the U.S. Attorneys' Manual states:
An officer or employee of an organization which is a target is not automatically to be considered as a target even if such officer's or employee's conduct contributed to the commission of the crime by the target organization, and the same lack of automatic target status holds true for organizations which employ, or employed, an officer or employee who is a target. Id. § 9-11.250 (Jan. 24, 1979).
will be paid to the following considerations: 1) the importance to the successful conduct of the grand jury's investigation of his testimony or other information sought; 2) whether the substance of his testimony or other information sought could be provided by other witnesses; 3) whether the questions the prosecutor and the grand jurors intend to ask or the other information sought would be protected by a valid claim of privilege.1' s The ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, section 3.6, contain two subsections relating to this issue:
(d) If the prosecutor believes that a witness is a potential defendant he should not seek to compel his testimony before the grand jury without informing him that he may be charged and that he should seek independent legal advice concerning his rights.
(e) The prosecutor should not compel the appearance of a witness before the grand jury whose activities are the subject of the inquiry if the witness states that if called he will exercise his constitutional privilege not to testify, unless [the] prosecutor intends to seek a grant of immunity according to law. As with other prosecutorial powers, federal courts are sensitive to the prejudicial effect of a putative defendant's appearance before the grand jury. In determining the extent to which prosecutors may exercise the power to compel a "target" to appear, the courts have looked to the prosecutor's motivation in seeking that appearance. Federal courts have held that the prosecutor commits an impropriety only if his sole purpose in subpoenaing a "target" before the grand jury is to force the target to claim his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination in front of the grand jury170 or to induce the prospective defendant to commit perjury.1 7 '
The courts have not found any impropriety when prosecutors call a "target" to testify knowing that he will "take the fifth," but several courts have 68Id. § 9-11.251 (Aug. 17, 1978 suggested that it would be a better practice for a prosecutor to inform the grand jury that no adverse inference can be drawn from a witness' invocation of his fifth amendment right.
The U.S. Attorneys' Manual goes even further than the courts by stating that:
[I]f a target of the investigation ... and his attorney state in a writing signed by both that the "target" will refuse to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds, the witness ordinarily should be excused from testifying unless the grand jury and the U.S. Attorney agree to insist on the appearance. In determining the desirability of insisting on the appearance of such a person, consideration should be given to the factors which justified the subpoena in the first place, i.e., the importance of the testimony or other information sought, its unavailability from other sources, and the applicability of the Fifth Amendment to the likely areas of inquiry.' 7 3
F. RIGHT OF PUTATIVE DEFENDANT TO TESTIFY OR
PRESENT EVIDENCE
The United States Attorneys' Manual gives a general outline as to when a putative defendant should be permitted to testify or present evidence.
[U]nder normal circumstances, where no burden upon the grand jury or delay of its proceedings is involved, reasonable requests by a "subject" or "target" of an investigation ... personally to testify before the grand jury ordinarily should be given favorable consideration, provided that such witness explicitly waives his privilege against self-incrimination and is represented by counsel or voluntarily and knowingly appears without counsel and consents to full examination under oath.
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The ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS are silent on the topic.
The federal courts have consistently held that prosecutors are not obliged to grant the request of a potential defendant to present evidence to a grand jury.' 7 5 The United States Attorneys' Man- See, e.g., United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779, 785 (2d Cir. 1968 ), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 946 (1969 United States v. Horowitz, 452 F. Supp. 415, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) .
'73 U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 10, § 9-11.254 (Aug. 17, 1978) .
14 Id. at § 9-11.252 (citations omitted).
' 75 See United States v. Salsedo, 607 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Donahey, 529 F.2d 831, 832 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976); United States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1975) Where a target is not called to testify pursuant to 9-11.251 ... and does not request to testify on his own motion ... , the prosecutor, in appropriate cases, is encouraged to notify such person a reasonable time before seeking an indictment in order to afford him an opportunity to testify (subject to the conditions set forth in 9-11.252 ... ) before the grand jury. Of course, notification would not be appropriate in routine clear cases nor where such action might jeopardize the investigation or prosecution because of the likelihood of flight, destruction or fabrication of evidence, endangerment of other witnesses, undue delay or otherwise would be inconsistent with the ends of justice. S. 181, 189 (1977) ("[b] ecause target witness status neither enlarges nor diminishes the constitutional protection against compelled self-incrimination, potential-defendant warnings add nothing of value to protection of Fifth Amendment rights"). But see United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1976 ), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 1031 (1978 . InJacobs the Second Circuit exercised its supervisory power to require that notice be given to targets of their status where it had been a long standing practice in the circuit for prosecutors to give such warnings. See also United States v. Crocker, 568 F.2d 1049 (3d Cir. 1977 .
'79 See United States v. Washington, 431 U. S. 181, 186, 190-91 (1977) ; United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 582 n.7 (1976) .
'80 In Mandujano, the Supreme Court observed that federal prosecutors customarily warn "targets" of their (Vol. 71
PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT
The U.S. Attorneys' Manual states:
Notwithstanding the lack of a clear constitutional imperative, it is the internal policy of the Department to advise grand jury witnesses of the following matters: 1) the general subject matter of the grand jury's inquiry (to the extent that such disclosure does not compromise the progress of the investigation or otherwise inimically affect the administration ofjustice; 2) that the witness may refuse to answer any question if a truthful answer to the question would tend to incriminate him; 3) that anything that the witness does say may be used against him; and 4) that the grand jury will permit the witness the reasonable opportunity to step outside the grand jury room to consult with counsel if he desires. This notification will be contained on a printed form (to be provided by the Department) which will be appended to all grand jury subpoenas. In addition, these "warnings" should be given by the prosecutor on the record before the grand jury when necessary and appropriate (e.g., when witness has not been subpoenaed), and the witness should be asked to affirm that the witness understands them.
181
H. THE DUTY TO PRESENT FAVORABLE EVIDENCE TO THE GRAND JURY
Since a putative defendant has no right to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, 182 the burden of presenting such evidence falls on the fifth amendment rights before questioning begins. 425 U.S. at 582 n.7. Also, in Washington, the Court noted that the administering of warnings at the outset of questioning in the grand jury negates the possibility of compelled selfincrimination that might otherwise exist. 431 U.S. at 188. 18 U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 10, § 9-11.250 (Aug. 17, 1978 Manual, which is more specific, states that:
Although neither statutory nor case law imposes upon the prosecutor a legal obligation to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury... it is the Department's internal policy to do so under many circumstances. For example, when a prosecutor conducting a grand jury inquiry is personally aware of substantial evidence which directly negates the guilt of a subject of the investigation, the prosecutor must present or otherwise disclose such evidence to the grand jury before seeking an indictment against such a person.' Cir. 1979 ) ("where a prosecutor is aware of any substantial evidence negating guilt he should, in the interest of justice, make it known to the grand jury, at least where it might reasonably be expected to lead the jury not to indict"); United States v. Olin Corp., 465 F. Supp. 1120 Supp. , 1127 Supp. (W.D.N.Y. 1979 prosecutor has a duty to present to a grand jury evidence which clearly negates guilt"); United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1033, 1040 (D. Md. 1976) ("'the prosecutor should be obliged to present evidence to the grand jury that is favorable to the prospective defendant"') (quoting M. Frankel & G. Naftalis, The Grand Jury, The New Leader, Nov. 10, 1975, at which indictments were dismissed for the prosecutors' failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.
In Phillips Petroleum the prosecutor continued to question a grand jury witness, before a court reporter, after the grand jury had been excused for the evening. During this evening session, the witness was able to explain in a manner that was exculpatory some incriminating testimony he had given before the grand jury. The prosecutor never revealed the exculpatory testimony to the grand jury. The court dismissed the indictment stating that "the failure to provide the evening testimony to the Grand Jurors was also a serious breach of the defendants' right to due process of law. "' 91 In Provenzano the only witness who identified the defendant as being involved in the charged crime expressed doubts to the prosecutor about the validity of this identification. The prosecutor never revealed the witness' doubts to the grand jury. The court, citing Phillips Petroleum, dismissed the indictment stating: "In this concededly one-witness identification case, this disregard for further facts bearing on the viability of the prosecution's case deprived the Grand Jury of an opportunity to evaluate all the evidence in determining whether to return an indictment.
' ' lH
In both Phillips Petroleum and Provenzano the prosecutors were personally aware of the favorable evidence that was withheld from the grand jury. Thus, the courts were not attempting to impose a duty on prosecutors to search for favorable evidence. The courts that impose an obligation on prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence of which they are aware represent the better view. Where a prosecutor has breached this obligation, dismissal is warranted.'
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The determination of materiality of a breach of a prosecutor's duty to disclose favorable evidence is different in the grand jury context than it is after a criminal charge has been brought because the standard of proof required is different. 1 9 The grand jury standard is probable cause, and at trial it is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The existence of a probability that a crime was committed by a putative defendant is much less easily removed than a reasonable doubt raised as to a defendant's guilt. Thus, the quantum of suppressed evidence required for remedial court action is greater at the grand jury level. Regardless of the magnitude of evidence required to create a grand jury violation, the prosecutorial obligation to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury should be fulfilled.
I. REQUIREMENT THAT PROSECUTORS MAINTAIN GRAND JURY SECRECY
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the proper functioning of the grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.1 97 Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Crim- (6th Cir. 1975 (6th Cir. ), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976 (1979) .
195 Dismissal will, of course, not end the matter. The government is free to reindict in a proceeding devoid of impropriety. But if the grand jury, with knowledge of the exculpatory evidence, reindicts, the defendant has been accorded his fifth amendment right to "an independent and informed grand jury." Wood v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375, 390 (1962 (1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or other friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to (Vol. 71 inal Procedure imposes the requirement of secrecy upon prosecutors, government personnel assisting them, the grand jurors, and court reporters in attendance at such proceedings. A defendant moving to dismiss an indictment based upon a breach of grand jury secrecy must overcome the presumption of regularity that is accorded to governmental activities. 20 1 To overprevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before the grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt. Id. at 628-29.
jury beyond that necessary for the performance of their official duties.
J. SUBMISSION OF THE PROPOSED INDICTMENT TO THE
GRAND JURY
Before an indictment can be filed in a United States District Court, both the grand jury and the United States attorney must agree on the charges to be brought. Therefore, after a grand jury has completed its investigation, the prosecutor prepares and submits a proposed indictment of charges which the grand jury can approve or disapprove. The United States attorney must then sign the indictment, for without his signature the indictment cannot properly be filed with a court.
There is a split in the district courts over whether presenting a signed proposed indictment unfairly influences the grand jurors during deliberations and voting. The court in United States v. Gold 2 held that it did. The weight of authority supports the view that submitting a signed indictment is not by itself improper.
2°I
t seems highly unlikely that the United States attorney's signature would be an influential factor in the grand jury's decision to indict. It is difficult to imagine how a grand jury which has heard the evidence and the prosecutor's summary and recommendation and, thereby, knowing the prosecutor's position on the matter, would be so swayed by the fact that it has in its possession a signed, as opposed to an unsigned, copy of the indictment that it would lose sight of its role to act as an independent and informed buffer between the accuser and the accused.
The requirement that the grand jury fulfill its role as an independent and informed buffer additionally means that at least twelve grand jurors who vote to return the indictment must have been present to hear all the evidence presented by the prosecutors relating to the indictment. The defendant must plead specific facts demonstrating prejudice resulting from preindictment delay.2° When the absence of a witness is the basis for the claim of prejudice caused by delay, the courts have required a showing that the witness "could have supplied material evidence for the defense. ' 
221
There is a split of authority among the federal courts as to whether one must show both substantial prejudice and intentional delay on the part of the government or only one of the two.Y2 Whichever standard for dismissal is imposed, prosecutors must be sensitive to the potential loss of evidence caused by any delay and should move as promptly as possible toward a resolution of all criminal matters under investigation so that a putative defendant's rights will not be infringed by the passage of time at the preindictment stage.
C. BARGAINING FOR TESTIMONY UNDER IMMUNITY
The usual procedure in the federal system for obtaining a grant of statutory immunity for a witness begins with the attorney for the witness presenting a proffer of his client's prospective testimony.2 There is no statutory requirement that ing the proffer, Rothman could not thereby bind the government. His offer was not accepted. Rothman would have us abandon the usual accepted concepts of applicable contract law and fashion some new standard for these circumstances. We decline, for to do so would unnecessarily destroy immunity as a useful prosecutorial technique.22 7 The Rothman court did not address the issue of the effect of the proffered information or the leads derived from that information once the government declines to immunize the witness. Proffers of testimony between defense counsel and prosecutors are considered to be "off the record," and if the proffer is rejected, both sides to the negotiations theoretically should be placed in the same position as before the proffer because the government by receiving the proffer gains valuable information about its possible case, and the witness, if still a potential defendant after rejection of the proffer, receives nothing for having made the proffer.= Even though the government cannot use the proffered information against the witness in its case in chief, leads therefrom can be used unless there was a bargained for prohibition against their use.ss If prosecutors, by their conduct in negotiating with a witness for immunity, cause the witness to believe that his proffered statements will not be used against him in any way, the government may be bound.2'° Therefore, prosecutors must be extremely careful not to make erroneous offers of immunity that could mislead a witness to waive his privilege against self-incrimination. Defense coun- m It is possible that the witness may have even antagonized the government personnel on the case by proferring what the prosecutor believes to be false information.
22 Without an agreement, the proffer, just like immunized testimony, could be used against the witness to impeach him. See Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971) ; United States v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 1079 (1974) . Moreover, without an agreement to the contrary, the government could use the proffered information to find other information that could be used against the witness. The defendant in Rothman did not contend that the government violated its promise not to use any leads arising from Rothman's proffer against him.
'23 See Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U. S. 341, 347-48 (1963) ; United States v. Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers of America, No. 77-2515 (4th Cir. Dec. 26, 1979 ; United States v. Nussen, 531 F.2d 15 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 839 (1976) ; United States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 846 (1968) . See also United States v. Garcia, 519 F.2d 1343 , 1345 (9th Cir. 1975 sel must be careful to understand clearly the parameters of the proffer agreement. In sum, it is important that the proffer arrangement be unambiguous and plainly understood by both sides.2 31 A problem inherent in the government's requirement that a witness or his lawyer present a proffer of proposed testimony is that the witness may feel pressured to conform his testimony to the government's prosecutorial theory. (1976) . 53 457 F. Supp. 571 (S.D. Tex. 1978) . 2Id. at 576. 23 International Paper was a Sherman Act price-fixing criminal conspiracy prosecution. The sentencing provisions of the Sherman Act were amended in December 1974 making a violation thereof after the date of the amendment a felony. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) . Therefore, whether acts in furtherance of the conspiracy took place in 1974 or 1975 made a crucial difference in whether the defendants were subject to misdemeanor or felony liability.
236 457 F. Supp. at 576 n.5. 237 Id. at 576.
[Vol. 71 suggestions, especially when coupled with the benefit of absolution from criminal liability conferred by an immunity grant. Since such suggestion could cause a witness to fashion his testimony according to the prosecution's desires, it is, therefore, necessary for prosecutors to refrain from coaxing or coaching a particular theory of how or when particular events happened. An erroneous story may result and justice thereby be denigrated.
with four Justices dissenting,2 9 approved the prosecutor's actions. As a result of the Hayes decision, most federal courts have applied a more permissive standard approving seemingly vindictive conduct in the plea bargain setting.2°O f course, outside the plea bargaining arena, the more stringent Blackledge standard against prosecutorial vindictiveness still applies.25 1 Once a defendant has demonstrated a prima facie case of vindictiveness, the government is typically accorded the opportunity to justify the prosecutor's decision to file charges. 2 2 There are several justifications that have been held sufficient to surmount vindictiveness charges by a defendant. Where prosecutorial action in bringing charges appears to coincide with a defendant's exercise of certain guaranteed rights, prosecutors can justify their acts by demonstrating that the evidence upon which later charges were based was not known at an earlier time or that charges were delayed to protect an informant's identity rather than to punish a successful appellant. 53 2'9 434 U.S. at 367-68 (Blackmun, J., with Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting); id. at 372-73 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[slince the prosecutor's admitted purpose was to penalize Hayes for exercising his right to trial, the conduct was constitutionally impermissible").
2° See, e.g., United States v. Allsup, 573 F.2d 1141, 1143-44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 961 (1978) (bringing gun charges against defendant who refused to accept plea bargain proposal in bank robbery prosecution held proper); United States v. Litton Sys., Inc., 573 F.2d 195, [198] [199] [200] , cert. denied, 439 U. S. 828 (1978) (bringing criminal fraud charges against government contractor who refused to relinguish contract in exchange for no prosecution held proper). But see United States v. Stacey, 571 F.2d 440, 443-44 (8th Cir. 1978 ) (even though defendant's demand for return of lawfully seized funds was a factor in prosecutor's decision to indict, prosecution not impermissibly vindictive because demand for funds is not a statutory right with due process implications).
" See, e.g., James v. Rodriquez, 553 F.2d 59, 62 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 889 (1977) In deciding whether to prosecute, a federal prosecutor in the proper conduct of his office should consider Department of Justice policies2 even though the federal courts have consistently expressed reluctance to dismiss an indictment brought in violation of Department of Justice policy when the dismissal is resisted by the prosecutor. 25 Such resistance on the part of federal prosecutors is improper, but a defendant is without redress. Federal prosecutors must be careful to conform with the policy guidelines because the courts may soon change their position of reluctance and mandate compliance by dismissing actions when the policies are not followed.
CONCLUSION
In the decades to come, preindictment prosecutorial conduct will continue to face increasing scrutiny by the courts in the federal system. The recording of all proceedings before a federal grand jury will aid the courts in that pursuit. Recording the proceedings, however, will not serve as a check of prosecutorial misconduct if persons adversely affected by improper preindictment conduct are unable to obtain access to the recording and thereby discover the impropriety. Most impropriety to date has been uncovered fortuitously. appeal does not make second indictment impermissible prosecutorial conduct); United States v. Partifka, 561 F.2d 118, 123 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1037 (1977) (filing of second indictment after successful appeal by defendant of earlier charge not impermissible because motivation of government in delaying the filing of the second indictment was to protect informant's identity and charges filed promptly once identity revealed).
25' Probably the best known prosecutorial policy of the Department of Justice is the Petite Policy, which derives its name from Petite v. United States, 361 U. S. 529, 530-31 (1960) , in which the Solicitor General confessed error because the Petite prosecution involved a federal indictment arising out of the same transaction for which the defendant had been prosecuted in state court. Department of Justice policy prohibits such prosecutions. Other examples of the Petite policy's application that have reached the Supreme Court are Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U. S. 22 (1977) , and Watts v. United States, 422 U. S. 1032 (1975) . See also Redmond v. United States, 384 U. S. 264 (1966) 
